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Abstract We propose a triple test to evaluate the usefulness of behavioral economics
models for public health policy. Test 1 is whether the model provides reasonably new
insights. Test 2 is on whether these have been properly applied to policy settings.
Test 3 is whether they are corroborated by evidence. We exemplify by considering
the cases of social interactions models, self-control models and, in relation to health
message framing, prospect theory. Out of these sets of models, only a correctly applied
prospect theory fully passes the tests at present. Specifically, in broad agreement with
the evidence, a gain frame has positive implications for welfare encourages disease
prevention activity, though this does not apply if the perceived probability of the bad
health outcome is large enough. We see our tests as being useful to identify how much
health policy weight policy makers should assign to specific behavioral economic
models; they are also useful to verify what next steps would be most useful in further
research.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral economics (BE) has been seen as holding great promise in a range of policy
applications, including that of improving health outcomes (Frank 2004; Zimmerman
2009; Loewenstein et al. 2007, 2012; Barberis 2013). This promise has been recog-
nized by policy- makers across a range of countries, including France (Ouillier and
Sauneron 2010), the United States (Lott 2013) and the United Kingdom (Dolan et al.
2010). It has broadly matched the rise of the behavioral ‘nudge’ agenda: the possi-
bility of obtaining quick wins in terms of policy outcomes by altering the decision
environment of the individual in a way that does not forbid any option or change any
economic incentive (see Thaler and Sunstein 2008). The original classic example by
Thaler and Sunstein concerned the case of a cafeteria where, by changing the place-
ment of healthy and unhealthy food, it would be possible to affect the extent to which
agents chose each. The alleged policy advantages, particularly to policy makers in an
age of economic recession, were clear: the potential of better health outcomes without
restricting the choice set of the rational consumer and, significantly, at little or no cost
for the policy maker.1
That said, a disconnection between the excitement of the promise of BE and the
evidence base has been noted (Marteau et al. 2011). Early proposers of BE have put
this in terms of policy getting ahead of science (Loewenstein et al. 2012), and of hard
shoves (in terms of regulation) being needed as much as soft nudges. A recent report
of the U.K. House of Lords has reached qualified conclusions on the potential of using
only behavioral interventions in affecting outcomes (House of Lords 2011). A recent
scoping review of choice architecture interventions has reached the conclusion that the
jury is still out on effect sizes for such interventions, both singly and in combination
(Hollands et al. 2013).
The key question of this paper is the degree to which BE is actually adding to the
public health policy debate. For the purpose of this paper, we define BE as comprising
economic models that relax the standard assumptions of rationality, pure self-interest
or both. We label ‘standard economic models’ as models that keep both of these
assumptions. BE mostly encapsulates and incorporates concepts and findings from
psychology or cognate disciplines, which are combined with economic modelling to
produce potentially new insights hopefully of interest outside economics, including
to policy makers (for examples, see Camerer et al. 2004; Skorˇepa 2011; Cartwright
2011). We propose a triple test for whether a behavioral economic model is relevant
for public health policy:
Test 1: the model has to yield specific predictions relative to standard economic
models or established psychological theories in terms of individual behaviors or
reaction to incentives;
Test 2: the model has to provide specific predictions regarding specific public
health policies;
Test 3: the model has to be appropriately validated by empirical evidence.
1 For a methodological criticism of libertarian paternalism as implied by the behavioral ‘nudge’ agenda,
see Sugden (2004) and for a recent debate on this criticism, see Schubert (2015) and Sugden (2015).
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Fig. 1 Identifying the value added of behavioral economics
This paper considers example BE models and shows how these tests can be usefully
employed.2 We consider three areas where one can, with some legitimacy, claim that
the first test is passed: social interactions; self-control devices; and prospect theory.
We find that, with the partial possible exception of the area of self-control, in all three
areas there needs to be further progress on the connection between insights from BE
models, policy application and corroboration. We suggest that the proposed triple test
can be employed to verify the policy relevance of BE insights. Section 2 provides
the conceptual background to our triple test. Sections 3, 4 and 5 consider our three
areas of application. The supplementary material provides relevant lists of empirical
references and key findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 A conceptual background
Figure 1 helps clarify key points underpinning the triple test being proposed here.
There is a long tradition of psychological research having policy implications (link
1 in Fig. 1); there is also a sizeable amount of empirical evidence in connection to
psychological concepts, including economic experiments that connect to them (link
2). While this needs not always be the case, BE often employs economic modelling
to formalize concepts and findings from psychology and deviations from standard
economic models (link 3); for example, the notion of social comparison and relative
utility which we shall consider in Sect. 3 draws its parentage both on social psychology,
e.g., the social exchange theory of Adams (1963), and on the cognitive psychology
of relative evaluations (e.g., Kahneman and Varey 1991, for references). BE can have
implications for policy (link 4). Test 1 is about whether something is gained concep-
tually in moving from psychology to policy through links 3 and 4 rather than directly
via link 1. In other words, does a behavioral economic model provide any reasonably
original insight that one would not be able to glean by employing not just standard
economic models but also plain vanilla psychological concepts? Note that we are not
2 A reader noted that these can be more general tests for evaluating the policy usefulness of models. While
this may or may not be the case, this paper follows a more focused and practical approach.
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stating that BE must not relate to or be inspired by psychological models. Clearly, this
will typically be the case. Nevertheless, the answer to the question on whether original
insights are provided will not always be positive, for two reasons.
First, some of BE has been about formalizing psychological concepts in rational
choice models that do not add any particular insight relative to such concepts, at least
in relevant policy domains. For example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) add a utility
function but little more to the kind of insights that can be drawn from the social
psychological research on group identity and intergroup relations (e.g., Hogg and
Abrams 2001, for a review). While this exercise is deemed valuable by economists
insofar as utility maximization is considered as the methodological golden rule by
most economists, non-economists and policy makers may not learn anything more
than they would by referring directly to the appropriate psychological concepts.
Second, sometimes BE is used to refer to concepts taken straight from traditional
behavioral psychology; for example, Murphy et al.’s (2007) review speaks of behav-
ioral economic approaches to reduce college student drinking, but actually simply
speak in terms of relative reinforcement and in terms of traditional economics (law of
demand), neither of which require any behavioral economic models; there is nothing
in Murphy et al. (2007) that modern behavioral psychological treatments (e.g., Fantino
and Logan 1979; Rachlin 1989) would not be able to explain.
Test 2 is also connected to link 4, and is about whether specific predictions follow
from the model for specific public health contexts; as Sect. 5 on prospect theory will
illustrate, this is not always straightforward.
Evidence-based policy requires, however, that in order for a prediction from BE to be
relevant, it not only has to be accurately drawn from a given behavioral economic model
for a specific public health setting, but also it has to be supported by evidence. Test 3
is connected to links 5 and 6 and requires evidence of validation of a given behavioral
economic model. Obviously, the extent to which it is possible to test predictions
that unambiguously validate a model may depend on the type of evidence available,
whether in the form for example of randomized control trials, laboratory or field
experiments, or econometric studies. Also, in considering evidence, there is no reason
to be restricted to evidence from economics (let alone behavioral and experimental
evidence).
One source of confusion with empirical evidence is that sometimes empirical studies
are motivated by policy (link 6) rather than by theory. As such, they are not tailored
to test specific behavioral economic models, and as a result they provide only weak
evidence in the context of Test 3; Sect. 4.3 will show an example of this.
3 Applying social interactions models to health behavior
3.1 Social interactions models and test 1
Our first illustration arises from research in BE on how peers’ behavior influences one’s
behavior, which can be labelled as peer effects for short. We consider three possible
channels through which peer effects have been modelled to affect health behavior: (i)
social learning; (ii) social comparison; (iii) self-esteem or moral concerns.
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Social learning refers to the idea that what others do has information that is relevant
for one’s choices, particularly when she is uncertain about the (health) consequence
of her behavior (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). The inspiration for this comes from social
learning theory in psychology, which has a long tradition (e.g., Bandura et al. 1961;
Bandura 1977).
Social comparison models reflect the idea that preferences are shaped by com-
parisons of oneself with others leading to conformism. The average behavior in the
society provides a reference point, and deviating from the reference point decreases
one’s utility (Blanchflower et al. 2009). A slightly different way to look at the social
comparison motive is that conformity may construct peer ties, which itself can be
desired (i.e., social capital).
In self-esteem, moral and social scrutiny models, a norm level of behavior is exoge-
nously given in a social group, and an individual loses utility if he or she is seen as
deviating from the norm. For example, Dragone and Savorelli (2012) investigate the
effect of manipulating the norm level of body shape by legislations such as banning
underweight fashion models. Of course, social psychologists have long recognized the
significance of social interactions (e.g., Asch 1955; Bond and Smith 1996). These BE
models potentially add specific policy relevant predictions. For example, and follow-
ing Dragone and Savorelli (2012), public health marketing policies to reduce the risk
of anorexia may lead to negative health costs in terms of promoting obesity that more
than offset the health benefits. Because of this, there is at least the potential for Test
1 to be passed, i.e., for insights to be provided that would not just be gleaned from
non-BE research.
3.2 Combining motivations from social interactions models
We present a composite representation which describes how health behavior is influ-
enced by social interactions. Social influence on health behavior including these three
motives has been investigated separately in the literature. In this sub-section, we com-
bine the three motives within one simple framework. For simplicity, we do not consider
pecuniary motives of health behavior (such as cost of medical treatments). We intro-
duce two types of norms, following Bicchieri (2006) and Bicchieri and Xiao (2009).
The first norm is based on empirical expectations, i.e., the observation of peers’ actual
behavior. The second norm is based on normative expectations, i.e., the observation
of peers’ desire or what peers expect him or her (not) to behave. These two norms are
often distinctive in health contexts. For example, there are people who smoke when
they observe their peers smoking, but share the idea that they should not smoke.
Consider a person j’s health behavior xj, x E−j denoting the empirical expectation of
peers’ behavior, and x N−j capturing the normative expectation. The individual maxi-
mizes the following utility by choosing the optimal xj:
Uj = −α2
[
xj − x0j
(
x E−j, 
)]2 − β
2
[
xj − x E−j
]2 − γ
2
[
xj − x N−j
]2
The utility comprises three distinctive motives, and deviation from them decreases
utility. The first term represents the social learning motive, by which x0j is her subjective
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ideal level of behavior, which is influenced by observation of peers’ actual behavior x E−j
and an idiosyncratic probabilistic component . This means that the person may not
be fully certain about what his or her best choice will be (due to lack of information),
and he or she uses peers’ behavior to form her preference (i.e., social learning). The
second term of the utility function captures social comparison conformism in the sense
that the person sets peers’ behavior as a reference point, and prefers to conform even
if it does not meet his or her self-interest motive (i.e., social comparison). Finally, the
third part gives self-esteem and moral concern, where the person wants to behave as he
or she perceives it is desired by peers x N−j to avoid disapprovals (as long as β, γ > 0).
Ignoring corner solutions, the first order condition is:
x∗j =
1
α + β + γ
[
αx0j
(
x E−j, 
)
+ βx E−j + γ x N−j
]
(1)
This is simply a weighted average of the subjective ideal, the empirical expectation, and
the normative expectation. This implies that the individual’s behavior is determined
by the relative importance of three motives. When the self-interest motive is important
(i.e., largeα), the individual’s behavior is more consistent with her subjective ideal level
x0j . The same logic applies to other cases, i.e., when social comparison is prominent
the individual acts as others do; when self-esteem is more important, she behaves as
(she thinks) is desired by others.
As shown later, most of the econometric analyses estimate the effect (or association)
of empirical expectation x E− j on behavior x∗j . Totally differentiating the first order
condition Eq. (1) yields:
dx∗j
dx E−j
= 1
α + β + γ
[
α
∂x0j
∂x E−j
+ β
]
(2)
This representation of the effect suggests that without an elaborate estimation strategy
the analysis does not distinguish the three motives. We return to this point in Sect. 3.4.
3.3 Test 2: policy implications
There are specific policy predictions from models embodying different motivations
related to social interactions, and in this sense Test 2 is satisfied. Each motive sug-
gests meaningfully different implications for policies to promote healthy outcomes. If
social learning is most prominent, an appropriate policy would be to provide precise
information about others’ health behavior, and also the consequence of the behavior,
through health educational policies. There is evidence that over-estimation of peers’
smoking rate is a significant determinant of smoking among adolescents (Reid et al.
2008). Also, if the reason for conformity is uncertainty in preference, labelling and
setting a default option in favor of healthier behavior would be helpful (Wisdom et al.
2010).
If social comparison is important, giving information about the “right” behavior will
not work, because individuals follow peers irrespective of how healthy or unhealthy
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the behavior may be. A possible policy would then require nicotinizing a shift to a
healthier behavior equilibrium. For example, the government or schools can increase
punishment for youth smoking. The government could also subsidize healthier options
such as gym charge.
If self-esteem, moral or social scrutiny is a main driver of peer effects, a less
resource-intensive policy could be effective to manipulate the perceived norm. For
example, media has strong power on one’s perception over what others think desirable.
Therefore, campaigning to change normative expectation through media, or restricting
the exposure to unhealthier norms, may prove to be an effective intervention.
3.4 Test 3: empirical evidence
Test 3 requires us to find evidence able to corroborate the specific predictions associated
with the different motivations associated with models linked to different motivations.
Experimental evidence. Interventions through social interactions to health behavior
have been mainly outside the economics literature. Most of such experimental studies
examine information-giving type interventions. For example, in a laboratory, provid-
ing information about norms, such as others’ attitude towards food and actual food
consumption, can influence own behavior (Croker et al. 2009; Pliner and Mann 2004).
Also, providing web-based and face-to-face feedback about norms can reduce alcohol
misuse among college students (Moreira et al. 2009). While evidence of the effec-
tiveness of providing information seems most consistent with a social learning story,
it could equally be consistent with the other two motivations: it could provide infor-
mation relevant for social comparison and, in a social scrutiny perspective, it could
make clear what the norm is and indeed what the experimenter wants experimental
subjects to do (Zizzo 2010). Zafar’s (2011) experiment usefully tries to decompose
social comparison and social scrutiny motives on charitable behavior. Image concern
is controlled by restricting the observability of one’s donating behavior, so that there is
no chance to earn esteem. The result indicates that both motives effectively influence
behavior. However, the experiment is not in a health context and does not control for
social learning.
Non-experimental evidence. Non-experimental studies in this particular field—
perhaps understandably—do not appear to be well connected to theoretical impli-
cations. So far the main purpose of the econometric studies has been to identify the
causal effect of peers’ behavior on one’s own behavior, and this is where (behavioral)
economists have made major methodological contributions to the literature. How-
ever, so far the studies typically do not fully address the motives underlying peer
effects. See Table A1 in the Online Appendix for a list of 36 relevant econometric
and experimental studies. Out of these, 15 studies investigate the peer associations
in food consumption and body weight; 17 studies are on substance use (in particular
tobacco and alcohol); 4 are studies on other outcomes (e.g., healthcare plan choice,
sick leave). The definition of social group (peers) varies remarkably from broader level
(e.g., same sex, same country) to narrow levels (neighborhood, classmates, roommates
and close friends). Some studies build theoretical models (as shown in the previous
subsection), or explicitly mention some background theoretical implications to moti-
vate their empirical investigations.
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The interpretability of regression coefficients is a challenging point for econometric
studies. A simple statistical association between peers behavior and one’s own behav-
ior may not reveal peer effects (Manski 1993, 2000). First, peers’ behavior influences
one’s behavior, and vice versa. Second, unobservable factors may be correlated with
both peers’ behavior and own behavior. Some previous studies present various strate-
gies to control for these confounding effects (for example, Nakajima 2007; Krauth
2006; Lee 2007). However, even when a researcher successfully controls for these
confounds, the question remains about why there are the peer effects in health behavior.
As shown by Eq. (2) and our earlier discussion, establishing a peer effect is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition to corroborate a specific health-related behavioral
motivation and its policy implications, since it does not distinguish possible motives
to conform. In this sense, there exists another fundamental identification problem.
3.5 Summary
The domain of social interactions is an illustration where BE models hold potential
for Tests 1 and 2, but there is an identification gap between models and evidence.
While enough evidence can be conjured that social interactions in some sense matter,
there is an insufficiently sharp evidence base from specific motivations connected to
social interactions motives. Therefore Test 3, on evidence corroborating models and
policies, is a stumbling block.
4 Applying self-control models to health behavior
4.1 Self-control devices models and Test 1
In psychology, self-control is typically seen as part of self-regulatory control processes
(e.g., Carver and Scheier 1982) or as response inhibition in the context of modern neu-
ropsychological models of behavior (Diamond 2013). Within BE, self-control models
encapsulate the basic game-theoretical intuition that fewer options can be good by
working as a commitment device. Because of the natural way in which this research
stems from this intuition from economics rather than psychology, the case for sat-
isfying Test 1 is reasonably straightforward, and specific policy predictions follow
from these models in health contexts to support this. Self-control devices can work as
commitment devices to promote positive health outcomes (Bryan et al. 2010).
Three modeling approaches to self-control problems are choice-set utility (Gul and
Pesendorfer 2001), intertemporal choice (Bernheim and Rangel 2004) and multiple
selves (Gruber and Köszegi 2001). While these models embody a similar intuition,
they sometimes draw different policy implications. For example, on the one hand
studies employing a hyperbolic discounting function generally suggest the use of
fiscal interventions such as tax to manipulate the price of tempting goods (Gruber
and Köszegi 2001). On the other hand, Bernheim and Rangel (2004) predict that a
price increase may not discourage consumption of tempting goods when self-control
is restricted in the hot state of mind. They suggest that avoiding environmental stimuli
that drive individuals to impulsive behavior may be a potential solution to address
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self-control problem. While the specificity of these predictions ensures that Test 1 is
passed, they create potential problems of identification of the kind we discussed in the
context of social interactions.
4.2 An illustrative model and Test 2
This section presents a simple model of self-control problems based on quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak 1968). For illustrative purpose, we consider
a smoking decision. Similarly to O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), we assume that
smoking gives positive immediate utility and affects health next period. Let S denote
smoking, which takes 1 if the person smokes and 0 otherwise. The immediate utility
of smoking is represented by v (S), and the health damage is represented by −h (S),
where we assume v (0) = h (0) = 0. The cost of smoking is p. The rest of the person’s
instantaneous budget M is spent on the composite good (which gives linear positive
utility) and the price is normalized to 1. Finally, we assume that the intertemporal
utility is given by the following standard quasi-hyperbolic discounting formulation:
u0 + β
T∑
k=1
δkuk,
where β, δ ≤1. The parameter β is often interpreted as the degree of self-control
problem. If β = 1, the function is the usual exponential discounting function.
For simplicity, we consider three periods (t=0, 1 and 2). In period 0, the person
plans whether or not to smoke in period 1; then, in period 1, the utility from smoking
materializes; and finally, the health damage of smoking is incurred in period 2. In
period 0 the person just plans (i.e., planner), and the actual behavior is taken in period
1 (i.e., doer). From the planner’s perspective in period 0, the utility in period 1 is given
by βδ [v (1) + M − p] if she smokes, and βδM if she does not smoke. Also, the utility
in period 2 is given by βδ2 [−h (1)] if he or she smokes in period 1 and 0 otherwise.
The planner decides to smoke in period 1 if the net utility of smoking exceeds the
net utility of non-smoking: βδ [v (1) + M − p] + βδ2 [−h (1)] ≥ βδM . Hence, the
person plans to smoke if:
p ≤ v (1) − δh (1) .
For the planner, the reservation price of a cigarette is given by p∗ = v (1) − δh (1).
In period 0, the person plans to smoke in period 1 if the cost of smoking is lower than
the immediate utility of smoking minus the discounted future health damage.
We turn to consider the doer’s problem in period 1. The immediate utility of smoking
is given by v (1)− M − p if she smokes, and M if she does not. The utility in the next
period is given by βδ [−h (1)] if she smokes, and 0 if she does not. The individual
smokes in period 1 if v (1) − M − p + βδ [−h (1)] ≥ M . The doer smokes if:
p ≤ v (1) − βδh (1) .
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The doer’s reservation price is given by p∗∗ = v (1) − βδh (1). Compared to the
previous condition to smoke for the planner, the doer discounts the future health
damage more heavily by βδ (where β, δ ≤1). This means that the doer accepts a
higher cigarette price than the planner. More specifically, if the actual cigarette price
is between p∗ and p∗∗: v (1) − δh (1) < p < v (1) − βδh (1), the doer smokes in
period 1 even though he or she planned not to smoke, a preference reversal.
When this preference reversal is likely to happen, there are ways for the planner to
restrict the doer’s behavior. The planner should make the doer’s reservation price of
cigarette (p∗∗) closer to the planner’s original reservation price p∗. Stronger restriction
will be needed depending on the degree of the self-control problem: a smaller β (i.e.,
larger discount) implies the need for stronger restrictions.
Commitment helps restrict the doer’s behavior. For instance, the planner can commit
to pay a higher price for a cigarette in period 1, so that the doer faces the higher price.
Similarly, he or she can commit to paying some amount of money in case she smokes.
Both commitments directly decrease the reservation price of cigarette for the doer
p∗∗∗ = v (1) − βδh (1) − C , where C is either the increased price or the punishment.
Incurring additional cost to smoke in this way brings the doer’s reservation price closer
to p∗.
Test 2 is met, in the sense that specific predictions for public health contexts follow
from these models. Some interventions can be regarded as self-control devices of a
similar kind. For example, fiscal interventions, such as tax or income transfer, can
alter the reservation price for the doer in the same way as the self-commitment. As in
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and elsewhere, exercising a higher tax on cigarettes
may prevent self-control lapses. Rewarding individuals for not smoking by lump-
sum transfer will work in the same direction as the price intervention. Immediate
rewards may be more effective, if the individual discounts the future rewards heavily
(Loewenstein et al. 2007).
Sometimes commitments may be considered as not involving (only) pecuniary
incentives but, for example, may include social image costs. In the above example,
the (shadow) price of cigarette p may include social image costs (e.g., of smoking
being seen as ‘uncool’), and people may use this to correct their future behavior. As
another example, Babcock and Hartman (2011) conduct a field experiment to examine
the impact of financial incentives on attending sports gym. They find that participants
whose peers are also treated are more likely to attend the gym. The potential problem
here is that, unless we add some psychological or BE story of why these should matter
in the given setting,3 this prediction does not in itself follow from the self-control
models, therefore failing Test 2.
4.3 Test 3: Empirical evidence
Table A2 in the Online Appendix summarizes a significant body of research on the
potential usefulness of self-control devices in health settings.
3 Babcock and Hartman provide several alternative explanations of their findings: (i) complementarities
in the utility; (ii) imitation; and (iii) information exchange among peers.
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Voluntary use of self-control devices. People may deliberately seek contracts that
could be construed as implying a desire to constrain their choice set as predicted by
self-control models (Halpern et al. 2012). For example, in a field experiment, Gine et al.
(2010) investigated the effect of a voluntary commitment device on smoking cessation,
i.e., Committed Action to Reduce and End Smoking (CARES). Smokers were offered
a saving account in which after six months they are refunded subject to passing a
nicotine test. Some smokers took up the scheme, with social pressure possibly having
played a role. The smoking cessation rate was higher for the participants than for the
control group, and the effects persisted in surprise tests one year later. However, given
the well-documented frequent failure of consumers’ best intentions in health (e.g.,
London 2013), there is again a question of whether something else, such as social
pressure, may have also been at work. Using US sports gyms data, DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006) find that consumers tend to enter fixed-term contracts and end up
paying more per visit than they would have paid in fees for single visits. They interpret
this as a form of overconfidence about either future self-control or future efficiency of
gym visits.
It is not clear from existing evidence how much commitment one should make and
it is also not clear how predictions from the self-control models would be verified,
either in terms of learning (Ali 2011) or in terms of trade-off between flexibility and
commitment (Amador et al. 2006). Moreover, if long run tastes change (Loewenstein
et al. 2003), predicting the optimal commitment from the self-control model may not
be appropriate.
Policy interventions. Non-voluntary commitment devices include governmental
interventions, and there is a long strand of related literature (see Table A2 in the Online
Appendix for a summary). For example, Charness and Gneezy (2009) conducted a
field experiment with university students to evaluate the impact of financial incentives
on attendance to a sports gym. Participants received money if they attended the gym as
they were assigned. Charness and Gneezy found that this incentive scheme increased
gym attendance even after the experimental intervention period, at least in the short
term.
A problem in interpreting findings on the effect of price changes (or equivalent)
on healthy behavior is that a more straightforward interpretation would be in terms of
law of demand from basic microeconomics: as the price goes up, demand goes down.
This would not explain an effect beyond the intervention period, and other theories
would be needed for that, such as reinforcement theories from traditional behavioral
psychology (e.g., Fantino and Logan 1979; Rachlin 1989), modern psychological habit
system theories (e.g., Daw et al. 2011) or economic theories of rational addiction or
habit formation (Becker and Murphy 1988; Rabin 2011). Self-control models however
also do not explain effects beyond the intervention period, unless they are combined
with other theories.
This brings us to the more general problem: these studies are all generally about the
link between policy recommendations and empirical evidence (the link 6 of Fig. 1),
but the empirical evidence is largely consistent with self-control models as well as
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a number of other models, and therefore is not the specific support of self-control
models that we would like in terms of Test 3.4
4.4 Summary
BE models of self-control have helped to bring self-control devices back in the policy
debate, and, in this sense at least, they have proved practically important and useful.
Self-control models have potential to pass Tests 1 and 2, but again there is an identi-
fication gap between models and evidence. There is also, in practice, often a need to
combine self-control models with other kinds of behavioral economic models, such
as ones on social interactions.
5 Applying prospect theory to message framing
5.1 The standard treatment of prospect theory and test 1
Prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1992) innovatively combines depen-
dence on a reference point, relative to which gains and losses can be identified; a
value function implying that subjects are loss averse, i.e., they dislike losses more
than they like gains; risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk lovingness in the
domain of losses, as identified again in the value function; and probability weighting.5
Because of the modelling framework and of the parsimonious way it combines and
draws implications from these features, it is plausible to assume that prospect theory
passes Test 1. Indeed, it is referred to in the psychological research on health message
framing starting from Rothman and Salovey (1997).
In relation to Test 2, health psychologists have drawn implications from prospect
theory for policy makers. They have done so with a focus on the framing of the decision
problem in terms of gains or losses and on the risk attitude differential features of the
value function. A classic example was shown in experimental work by Tversky and
Kahneman (1981): when people choose between two treatment programs framed in
terms of the number of lives that will be lost, they risk the possibility of greater losses
to avoid a certain loss; when the same programs are described in terms of the number
of lives that will be saved, people become more conservative in their preferences.
Hence they forego the opportunity for greater gains, in exchange for an alternative
that provides a certain gain. Although the frame shifts in the two scenarios from lives
lost to lives saved, the objective features of the proposed interventions remain constant
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981).
4 Burger and Lynham’s (2009) evidence on 70% of bettors explicitly referring to the need of a self-
commitment device is obviously potentially more directly relevant evidence, though, as noted earlier,
the same bettors ended up being money pumps for betting companies to take advantage ofbut the self-
commitment device rarely worked.
5 We follow Barberis (2013) in this list and the cumulative prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) in the treatment below. For broader developments in the study of decision making under risk in
behavioral economics, see Starmer (2000).
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In the health psychology research, the expectation has been that gain- and loss-
framed appeals will be differentially persuasive for disease detection behaviors (such
as mammography, HIV testing, or cholesterol screening) and disease prevention behav-
iors (such as healthy dieting, exercising, or dental hygiene), by virtue of the differences
in the risk associated with those behaviors (Salovey and Wegener 2003; Schneider
et al. 2001).6 The underlying idea is that prevention behavior tends to be perceived
as entailing a reduction in the risk of the bad health outcome relative to the present
health status, and so a gain frame encouraging risk aversion should lead to greater
engagement in prevention behavior. Conversely, detection behaviors are typically per-
ceived as involving a risk that illness may be discovered. A more risk loving attitude,
as induced by a loss frame, would then be preferable.
5.2 Test 2: Identifying predictions from prospect theory
This sub-section considers whether the typical prediction from prospect theory in a
health context of prevention and detection activity passes Test 2: that is, is it generally
the case that prospect theory implies that a loss frame is better than a gain frame for
encouraging detection activity, and vice versa for prevention activity? As it turns out,
the picture is more nuanced, and this can be shown even in a very simple application
of prospect theory to our setting.
Assume for simplicity that there are two time periods, 1 and 2. There are two
possible health outcomes, negative and positive. A negative health outcome occurs in
period 2 with probability p in a state of the world in which prevention or detection
activity has not taken place; if it has taken place, and purely to simplify the presentation
below, we assume the negative health outcome never occurs. Prevention and detection
behaviors take place in period 1. Prevention and detection activities have a financial
and/or psychological cost of z > 0. If detection activity takes place in period 1, in a
gain frame there is a ‘pleasure’ d > 0 of learning one is healthy, while in a loss frame
there is a pain—d of learning that one is sick. Define w() as a weighted probability.
We assume that the likelihood of the bad health outcome is not large and it is perceived
and weighted by the person as not large relative to how the likelihood of a good health
outcome is perceived:
Assumption 1 w(p) << 0.5 << w(1 − p).
Note that Assumption 1 permits the difference w(p)–w(1 − p) to be smaller than
that between pand (1 − p), i.e., it allows for overweighting of small probabilities; it
plausibly assumes, however, that people will typically still be able to clearly identify
what is more likely and what is not.
In a gain frame (+), the utilities of a positive and a negative health outcome in period
2 are perceived as x and 0, respectively, with x > 0. In a loss frame (−), the utilities
of a positive and a negative health outcome in period 2 are perceived as 0 and −x ,
6 Salovey and Wegener (2003), for instance, note that from “a prospect theory point of view, the per-
ceived risk (of finding an abnormality) could make loss-framed messages more persuasive in promoting
the detection behaviors. However […] gain-framed messages might be more likely to facilitate performing
prevention behaviors” (pp. 57–58).
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Fig. 2 A prospect theory value function
respectively. We further assume that agents discount period 2 according to a discount
factor δ ≥ 0, and that utility is additively separable between periods 1 and 2. Agents
follow prospect theory and, in the absence of detection and prevention activity, we can
write their utility function as:
U+ = w(1−p)v(x)1+δ in a gain frame
U− = w(p)v(−x)1+δ in a loss frame,
where U+and U−are an increasing function of w() and v(); v()is the monotonically
increasing prospect theory value function, and, for simplicity and without loss of
generality, v(0) = 0, v(x) > 0, v(d) > 0. Our second assumption reflects the loss
aversion and differential risk attitude in the domain of losses that is highlighted in
the usual applications of prospect theory, with kx > 0 and kd > 0 being coefficients
embodying the difference in valuation if x is perceived in the domain of losses rather
than in that of gains:
Assumption 2 |v(−x)| = v(x) + kx and |v(−d)| = v(d) + kd .
Figure 2 shows a value function as an example.
Prevention behavior. In a gain frame, the agent will engage in prevention behavior
in period 1 if the expected discounted gains from prevention are higher than the
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prevention cost:
w(1 − p)v(x)
1 + δ − z > 0. (3)
In a loss frame, the agent will engage in prevention behavior if the expected discounted
avoided loss from prevention is higher than the prevention cost:
− w(p)v(−x)
1 + δ − z =
w(p)[v(x) + kx ]
1 + δ − z > 0. (4)
If we restrict ourselves to Assumption 2 alone, kx implies that Eq. (4) is more likely
to be satisfied than Eq. (3): intuitively, in a loss frame, the risk of a loss should
naturally lead the loss averse person to engage in more prevention behavior to avoid
the loss than if there is the possibility of a gain in a gain frame. Note however that, as
long as the probability of the negative health outcome is small and remains perceived
reasonably as such (Assumption 1), it is reasonable to hypothesize that w(1−p)v(x) >
w(p)v(x) + kx . If Assumption 1 does not hold, a negative frame may be roughly as
good or even better than a gain frame. However, if Assumption 1 holds, a gain frame
will generally be better for encouraging prevention, if not for the reason normally
used.
Detection behavior. In comparing detection behavior with prevention behavior,
there is an additional term to be considered, namely the psychological value v(d)in
period 1 from knowing about a negative health outcome in period 2. In a gain frame,
Eq. (3) now becomes:
w(1 − p)v(x)
1 + δ − z − w(1 − p)v(d) = w(1 − p)
[
v(x)
1 + δ − v(d)
]
− z > 0 (5)
while Eq. (4) for a loss frame becomes:
− w(p)v(−x)
1 + δ − z + w(p)v(−d) = w(p)
[
v(x) + kx
1 + δ − v(d) − kd
]
− z > 0. (6)
Predictions here are generally ambiguous: while (6) could hold while (5) does not,
implying that a loss frame is better in encouraging detection behavior, it is also entirely
possible that (5) holds while (6) does not. Assume that (5) holds; Eq. (6) then may not
hold if kx/(1+δ)−kd < 0, i.e., depending on the degree of intertemporal discounting
and on the precise shape of the value function in the loss domain relative to that in the
gain domain.
5.3 Test 3: considering empirical evidence on health message framing
We now move on to Test 3: how specific predictions of prospect theory fit with evi-
dence on health message framing. Virtually all of this work has been carried out in a
randomized experimental study design, as opposed to an observational one. A major
difference among existing studies is the outcome variables, which comprise attitudes,
123
R. Nakamura et al.
intentions7 or actual behavior. We focus on behavior, as this is what prospect theory
predictions are about. Table A3a in the Online Appendix summarizes a non-exhaustive
list of primary studies on prevention behavior, most of which focus on oral health and
physical activity promotion; and Table A3b in the Online Appendix assembles studies
on detection behavior, of which a majority is on breast cancer screening. All of the
studies in these tables use behavioral measures as their relevant outcomes.
Prevention behaviors. The studies covering prevention behaviors include a majority
of studies on prevention of skin cancer, oral health problems and on the promotion of
physical activity, while most of the detection behavior studies relate to breast cancer
screening, followed by skin cancer screening. We list a few studies where pand as
a result v(p) may be perceived as high: Knapp (1991) and Mann et al. (2004) are
about oral health, and cavities may be seen as likely if oral health measures are not
undertaken; in Richardson et al. (2004), the probability of HIV contagion may be
perceived as high by the HIV-positive subject sample that was used; and in Trupp et al.
(2011), again with a sample of patients. Other than Mann et al. (2004), where there
is no aggregate effect of framing, in the other three cases a loss frame was superior
in inducing prevention behavior (Knapp 1991; Trupp et al. 2011); these results are
consistent with the prospect theory once Assumption 1 is relaxed (see Sect. 5.2).
Gallagher and Updegraff (2011) explicitly look at the perceived probability v(p) and
find the superiority of a loss frame when the perceived probability of breast cancer is
average or high.
Where Assumption 1 is more likely to be satisfied, the picture is different. Detweiler
et al. (1999) is an influential early study exploring the impact of message framing on
skin cancer prevention was. They recruited a demographically and economically fairly
diverse sample of 217 adult beach-goers in southern New England. Participants were
given a brochure containing the framing manipulation as well as general information
about skin cancer. A strong gain-framed advantage was found for the behavioral mea-
sure employed (requests for free sunscreen with protection factor 15), though the lack
of follow up allowed no assessment of any sustained behavior change effect. Rothman
et al. (1993) also found the superiority of a gain frame with a behavioral measure in
relation to skin cancer prevention. In three out of six studies on physical activity or
healthy diet reported in Table A3a in the Online Appendix, a gain frame was superior
at least to some degree in three studies, with no significant effect of the frame in the
other three (more detail can be found in the table).
Detection behaviors. Breast cancer screening has thus far been the most frequently
examined detection behavior in this field. While some studies supported the origi-
nal Rothman and Salovey (1997) prediction of loss-framed messages outperforming
gain-framed ones when it comes to detection behaviors, other studies did not find
significant difference; while one study in the context of smoking prevention found
gain-framed messages outperforming loss-framed ones (see Table A3b in the Online
Appendix for more detail). As an example, Finney and Iannotti (2002) explored an
intervention aimed at increasing women’s adherence to recommendations for annual
mammography screening. The intervention involved sending out one of three reminder
7 See, e.g., Rothman et al. (1993) as a widely cited early study testing the effect of gain vs. loss framing
on the intention to seek skin cancer screening.
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letters (positive frame, negative frame, or standard hospital prompt) to 929 randomly
selected women who were due for mammography screening and had been identified
as having either a positive or negative family history of breast cancer. There was no
significant effect of a gain vs. loss frame.
Meta-analyses. The discussion above has been selective, but, fortunately, a number
of recent meta-analyses have been undertaken to examine the considerable empirical
evidence base more systematically (for example, O’Keefe and Wu 2012; Gallagher and
Updegraff 2012). No relevant meta-analysis that we are aware of supports the Rothman
and Salovey (1997) interpretations of prospect theory as such. The meta-analysis of
interest is Gallagher and Updegraff (2012), as it is the only one that focuses exclusively
on studies that measured behavioral outcomes rather than attitudes or intentions. It
is consistent with what we predicted in Sect. 5.2 based on a proper application of
prospect theory: overall, gain-framed messages were more effective for prevention
behaviors than loss-framed messages, while there was no clear superiority of either
framing approach in the case of detection behaviors. Therefore, a properly applied
prospect theory broadly passes Test 3.
5.4 Summary
Based on Test 1, prospect theory is a good candidate as a BE model that may matter
for health outcomes. This section considered health message framing as an area of
policy relevance where prospect theory can be applied. The traditional interpretation
of prospect theory does not follow from a basic model applying prospect theory, and
so such a traditional interpretation does not pass Test 2. It also does not pass Test 3,
given the empirical evidence.
Once prospect theory is properly applied, there are no clear predictions for detection
activities, nor should they be expected. The good news is that a gain frame encourages
prevention activity, though this does not apply if the perceived probability of the bad
health outcome is large enough.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed a triple test to evaluate the usefulness of BE models for public
health policy. Test 1 is about yielding specific predictions relative to standard eco-
nomic models or psychological theories in terms of individual behaviors or reaction
to incentives. Test 2 is about linking the specific predictions to specific public health
settings. Test 3 is about validating the model with evidence. Where a test is not passed,
in particular Tests 2 or 3, this may point to directions for needed further research.
We have illustrated our analysis by considering, in different ways, three cases where
a plausible claim can be made that Test 1 is passed. We recognize the differences across
the cases: for example, prospect theory is a single model (if in different versions),
whereas the other two cases are more akin to families of models building on related
intuitions. Social interaction models need to be decomposed in different motivations
for social interactions to have specific predictions for health policy settings and pass
Test 2. Social learning, social comparisons and self-esteem motivations and associated
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models make different predictions for health policy settings, and more work is needed,
in relation particularly to Test 3, as the experimental evidence is limited and as based on
the current non-experimental evidence it is not possible to differentiate among different
motivations. The evidence in relation to self-control models is largely consistent with
self-control models as well as a number of other models, and so more work is needed
to pass Test 3.
We have considered prospect theory in the context of health message framing as
our third application. The claimed policy messages from the theory do not seem to
match the evidence. By a simple example model, we have shown how the reason is
that the theory has been misapplied. Once this problem with Test 2 is fixed, and the
correct predictions are drawn from the model, we find that, in broad agreement with
the evidence, a gain frame has positive implications for welfare as it does encourage
disease prevention activity, though this does not apply if the perceived probability of
the bad health outcome is large enough.
We see our tests as being useful to identify how much health policy weight to assign
to specific behavioral economic models; and, constructively, to verify what next steps
would be most useful in further research.
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